Cuối thế kỷ 19, cuộc Cách Mạng Công Nghiệp diễn ra ở châu Âu, máy móc được áp dụng rộng rãi, nhu cầu về nguyên liệu và thị trường tiêu thụ tăng vọt (vì sản xuất ra quá nhiều hàng hoá). Thị trường châu Âu không đáp ứng nổi nhu cầu này.
Các nước châu Âu bắt đầu đi tìm thị trường và nguồn tài nguyên mới, và châu Phi là 1 miếng mồi ngon. Các nước tư bản đổ xô vào giành giật thuộc địa ở châu Phi. Để dễ cai trị những thuộc địa này, người châu Âu ra sức củng cố tư tưởng phân biệt chủng tộc, khơi lên các hận thù giữa các bộ lạc, gây tình trạng bất ổn triền miên ở châu Phi cho đến tận ngày nay, và dân châu Phi sống trong tình trạng đói khổ.
Những cuộc đấu tranh, nổi loạn liên tiếp bùng lên ở châu Phi và các nước tư bản vất vả đàn áp.
Trong khi đó, nhóm các nước tư bản cũng phát sinh mâu thuẫn về phân chia thuộc địa, nên nổ ra cuộc chiến tranh thế giới I, rồi đến cuộc chiến tranh thế giới II.
Sau chiến tranh thế giới II, hệ thống thuộc địa trở nên bất ổn hơn, các nước XHCN trợ giúp và khuyến khích châu Phi nổi lên, nhiều thuộc địa trên thế giới tranh thủ giành độc lập sau chiến tranh… Các nước Tư Bản mệt mỏi trong việc đàn áp nên chỉ khống chế các nước châu Phi thông qua các đảng cầm quyền. Và Nam Phi cũng chung số phận với nhiều nước khác, bị lãnh đạo bởi các chính phủ thân tư bản.
Năm 1948, đảng Quốc Gia Nam Phi (đảng của người da trắng) cầm quyền tại Nam Phi công bố 1 bộ luật phân biệt chủng tộc nặng nề tên là Apartheid, trong đó chia người dân thành ba nhóm chủng tộc chính: người da trắng, người châu Phi da đen, và người da màu hay người có nguồn gốc lai. Luật xác định quyền hạn, nghề nghiệp và nền giáo dục mà mỗi nhóm người được hưởng. Bộ luật ngăn cấm sự giao thiệp xã hội giữa các chủng tộc, cho quyền phân biệt các điều kiện cộng đồng và phủ nhận bất cứ sự đại diện nào của những người không thuộc nhóm người da trắng trong chính phủ quốc gia.
Những cuộc phản đối nổ ra ở Nam Phi, ban đầu dưới hình thức biểu tình dưới sự lãnh đạo của nhà chính trị Nelson Mandela. Chính quyền đàn áp thẳng tay các phong trào này.
Vì vậy, Nelson Mandela bắt đầu lãnh đạo phong trào đi theo hướng bạo động hơn, tiến hành 1 số hoạt động phá hoại, và dự định tiến hành chiến tranh du kích. Ngày 5 tháng 8 năm 1962, Nelson Mandela bị bắt.
Tháng 4 năm 1964, ông phải ra tòa vì cáo buộc hoạt động vũ trang trong tổ chức ANC (Đảng Quốc Đại) chống lại chính phủ.
Chúng ta hãy cùng nghe bài phát biểu của ông tại tòa, về nguyên nhân đưa ông đi từ biện pháp hoà bình đến bạo động. Bản thân bài phát biểu này đã rất đầy đủ thông tin và chúng ta cũng không cần phân tích gì thêm.
Một bài diễn văn rõ ràng, rành mạch và logic, cung cấp đầy đủ các chứng cứ xác thực không thể chối cãi, cho thấy nhiệt huyết và định hướng rõ ràng của một người lãnh đạo.
Về tác giả (nguồn Wikipedia)
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, sinh ngày 18 tháng 7 năm 1918, là Tổng thống Nam Phi từ năm 1994 đến 1999, và là tổng thống Nam Phi đầu tiên được bầu cử dân chủ theo phương thức phổ thông đầu phiếu. Trước khi trở thành tổng thống, Mandela là nhà hoạt động chống chủ nghĩa apartheid (chủ nghĩa phân biệt chủng tộc), và là người đứng đầu Umkhonto we Sizwe, phái vũ trang của Đảng Quốc Đại (ANC). Vào năm 1962 ông bị bắt giữ và bị buộc tội phá hoại chính trị cùng các tội danh khác, và bị tuyên án tù chung thân. Mandela đã trải qua 27 năm trong lao tù, phần lớn thời gian là ở tại Đảo Robben. Sau khi được trả tự do vào ngày 11 tháng 2 năm 1990, Mandela đã lãnh đạo đảng của ông trong cuộc thương nghị để tiến tới một nền dân chủ đa sắc tộc vào năm 1994. Trong nhiệm kỳ tổng thống của mình từ năm 1994 đến 1999, Mandela thường ưu tiên cho vấn đề hòa giải dân tộc.
Tại Nam Phi, Mandela còn được biết tới với tên gọi Madiba, một tước hiệu danh dự mà bộ lạc của ông thường trao cho những già làng.
Mandela đã nhận hơn 250 giải thưởng trong hơn bốn thập niên, trong đó có Giải Nobel Hòa bình năm 1993.
(Nguyễn Mai Anh Kiệt giới thiệu)
Tôi là Bị Cáo Đầu Tiên
Để bắt đầu, tôi muốn nói rằng lời đề nghị do Công tố Nhà nước đưa ra trong phần mở đầu rằng cuộc đấu tranh tại Nam Phi chịu ảnh hưởng của những người nước ngoài và những người cộng sản là hoàn toàn không chính xác. Tất cả những gì tôi đã làm, cả ở tư cách là một cá nhân đồng thời là một người lãnh đạo nhân dân của mình, xuất phát từ trải nghiệm của tôi về Nam Phi và từ nền tảng là một người Phi Châu mà bản thân tôi cảm thấy vô cùng tự hào, chứ không phải vì những phát biểu của bất kỳ một người ngoài xa lạ nào đó.
…Đầu tiên chúng tôi (Mandela và tổ chức Umkhonto – Ngọn Giáo của Quốc Gia) tin rằng: như là một hệ quả của chính sách của Nhà nước cầm quyền, tình trạng bạo động của những người dân ở Phi Châu gần như đã là một tất yếu, và nếu như không có sự lãnh đạo có trách nhiệm để hướng dẫn và kiềm chế phản ứng cảm tính của người dân, sẽ bùng nổ ra chủ nghĩa khủng bố tạo nên sự thù ghét và thù địch lên đến đỉnh điểm giữa các sắc tộc khác nhau trong đất nước này mà cho dù chiến tranh cũng chưa chắc tạo ra tình trạng nghiêm trọng đến thế. Thứ hai, chúng tôi cảm giác rằng nếu không sử dụng bạo lực sẽ không có cách nào khác để đưa người dân Phi Châu chiến thắng cuộc đấu tranh của họ chống lại nguyên lý da trắng thượng đẳng. Tất cả những phương cách hợp pháp bày tỏ sự đối nghịch với nguyên lý này đều bị đóng kín bằng luật pháp, và chúng tôi bị đặt trong một vị trí hoặc là chúng tôi chấp nhận ở luôn trong tình trạng tự xem là thấp kém hơn hoặc phải đấu tranh chống lại Nhà nước. Chúng tôi chọn đấu tranh không tuân thủ luật pháp. Đầu tiên chúng tôi vi phạm luật nhưng cố tránh gây ra bất kỳ hành vi bạo lực nào; khi cách thức này bị đàn áp hợp pháp bằng luật pháp và Nhà nước tìm cách biểu dương vũ lực để đè bẹp những gì đối lập với chính sách của Nhà nước, chỉ khi đó chúng tôi mới phải quyết định đáp trả với bạo lực bằng bạo lực.Nhưng bạo lực mà chúng tôi chọn tiến hành không phải là chủ nghĩa khủng bố. Chúng tôi những người thiết lập nên Umkhonto tất cả đều là thành viên của ANC (African National Congress – Đảng Quốc Đại), và phía sau chúng tôi là truyền thống phi bạo động lâu đời của ANC luôn sử dụng thương lượng làm phương pháp giải quyết các bất đồng về chính trị…
…Theo lời của vị lãnh đạo của tôi, Thủ lĩnh Lutuli, người trở thành Chủ tịch của ANC năm 1952, và sau đó được thưởng Giải Nobel Hòa bình:
“Ai sẽ phủ nhận rằng 30 năm của cuộc đời tôi đã được dùng để gõ một cách vô ích, kiên nhẫn, trầm lặng, và khiêm tốn lên một cánh cửa đóng kín và bị lèn chặt? Kết quả tốt đẹp của sự cố gắng tiết chế là gì? 30 năm vừa qua đã chứng kiến con số lớn nhất các quy định luật pháp hạn chế quyền và sự tiến bộ của chúng tôi, cho đến ngày nay chúng tôi đã tiến đến chỗ chúng tôi gần như không có quyền gì hết”
Năm 1960 Nhà Nước cầm quyền tổ chức một cuộc trưng cầu dân ý mà từ đó nhà nước Cộng Hòa được thành lập. Người Phi Châu, những người chiếm 70% dân số Nam Phi, không có quyền để bầu cử và họ thậm chí cũng không được tham khảo ý kiến về những kiến nghị thay đổi hiến pháp. Tất cả chúng tôi nhận thức rất rõ tương lai của mình bị đặt dưới Nhà Nước Cộng Hòa của Người Da Trắng được đề nghị, và do vậy đã có quyết định tổ chức một Hội Thảo Tất Cả Những Người Phi Châu để kêu gọi một Cuộc triệu tập Quốc gia, và tổ chức hàng loạt các cuộc biểu tình biểu dương lực lượng… Vì tất cả những cuộc biểu tình do người Phi châu tổ chức là bất hợp pháp, người tổ chức những cuộc biểu tình này phải tránh bị bắt. Tôi đã được chọn làm người này, và hệ quả tất yếu là tôi phải rời bỏ nhà và gia đình tôi và công việc của mình và tìm cách trốn tránh để tránh bị bắt.
Tôi phải quay trở lại thời điểm tháng 6 năm 1961. Lúc đó chúng tôi, những người lãnh đạo đồng bào chúng tôi, phải làm gì? Có phải chúng tôi phải đầu hàng trước sự biểu dương vũ lực và sự đe dọa ngầm đàn áp các hành động trong tương lai, hay là chúng tôi phải chiến đấu chống lại và, như vậy, bằng cách nào?
Chúng ta không được phép quên rằng đến giờ này bạo lực, trong thực tế, đã trở thành đặc điểm của chính trường Nam Phi. Bạo lực đã xảy ra vào năm 1957 khi những người phụ nữ Zeerust bị ra lệnh phải mang thẻ lưu hành; vào năm 1958 khi thi hành luật lựa chọn gia súc ở Skhukhuniland; vào năm 1959 khi người dân Cato Manor biểu tình chống lại những cuộc đột kích khám xét thẻ lưu hành; vào năm 1960 khi Nhà Nước cố gắng áp đặt đạo luật Bantu Authorities vào vùng Pondoland. 39 người Phi Châu đã chết trong những rối loạn này. Năm 1961 đã có những cuộc bạo loạn ở Warmbaths, và vùng Transkei đã luôn luôn là một khối bất ổn sôi sục. Mỗi cuộc bạo loạn đều chỉ ra một cách rõ ràng một niềm tin lớn dần hiển nhiên trong lòng người Phi Châu rằng bạo lực là cách duy nhất để giải quyết mọi thứ – nó cho thấy rằng Nhà Nước nào sử dụng vũ lực để duy trì thể chế của họ cũng dạy cho những người bị áp bức sử dụng vũ lực để chống lại Nhà nước.
Đầu tháng 6/1961, sau một thời gian dài đánh giá tình hình Nam Phi nhiều lo âu, tôi, và một số đồng sự, đã đi đến kết luận rằng khi bạo lực ở đất nước này là không thể tránh khỏi, sẽ là thiếu thực tế và không đúng nếu những người lãnh đạo Phi Châu tiếp tục thuyết giảng về hòa bình và phi bạo lực vào thời điểm mà Nhà Nước đáp trả lại những yêu cầu hòa bình của chúng ta bằng vũ lực.
Đã rất nhiều người Phi Châu đã chết như là hệ quả của những va chạm về màu da. Năm 1920 khi nhà lãnh đạo nổi tiếng Masabala bị bắt giữ trong nhà giam Cảng Elizabeth, 24 người trong một nhóm người Phi Châu tập họp lại để yêu cầu thả ông đã bị cảnh sát và thường dân da trắng giết hại. Năm 1921, hơn 100 người Phi Châu đã chết trong vụ Bulhoek. Năm 1924, hơn 200 người Phi Châu bị giết khi Tổng đốc Tây Nam Phi dẫn đầu lực lượng đàn áp một nhóm nổi loạn chống lại thuế về chó. Ngày 1/5/1950, 18 người Phi Châu đã chết vì bị cảnh sát nã súng vào trong khi biểu tình. Ngày 21/3/1960, 69 người Phi Châu không có vũ khí đã chết tại Sharpeville.
Còn bao nhiêu Sharperville nữa sẽ xảy ra trong lịch sử của đất nước chúng ta? Và còn bao nhiêu Sharperville nữa mà đất nước chúng ta có thể chịu đựng mà bạo lực và khủng bố không trở thành chuyện hàng ngày? Và điều gì sẽ xảy ra cho đồng bào chúng ta khi tiến đến giai đoạn đó? Trong tầm nhìn dài hạn, chúng tôi cảm giác rằng chúng tôi chắc chắn phải thành công, nhưng chúng tôi và cả nước còn lại phải trả bằng cái giá nào? Và nếu điều này xảy ra, làm sao người da đen và người da trắng còn có thể sống chung với nhau trong hòa bình và hòa thuận? Đây là những vấn đề đặt ra cho chúng ta, và đây là những quyết định của chúng tôi.
Cuộc đấu tranh của chúng tôi chống lại những khó khăn hay gọi theo ngôn từ của Công Tố Viện Nhà Nước “cái gọi là khó khăn”, có thật, không phải tưởng tượng. Cơ bản nhất, chúng tôi đấu tranh chống lại 2 điểm chính vốn là những dấu ấn của đời sống người Phi Châu ở Nam Phi và đã được củng cố bởi những quy định luật pháp mà chúng tôi tìm cách xóa bỏ. Hai vấn đề đó là đói nghèo và thiếu tôn trọng phẩm cách con người…
Nam Phi là nước giàu nhất ở Châu Phi, và có thể là một trong những nước giàu nhất thế giới. Nhưng đây cũng là mảnh đất của những sự tương phản rất lớn và lên đến cực điểm. Người da trắng hưởng thụ cuộc sống có thể nói là có tiêu chuẩn sống cao nhất thế giới, trong khi người Phi Châu sống trong nghèo đói và khổ sở. 40% người Phi Châu sống trong những Khu Bảo Tồn đông nghẹt, và một số trường hợp, cực kỳ hạn hán, một cách tuyệt vọng, ở đó đất bị xói mòn và bị tận dụng kiệt cùng đến mức không có một sinh vật sống nào có thể mọc lên một cách bình thường từ đó. 30% là người lao động tay chân, cho thuê sức lao động, và người làm công ở các trang trại của người da trắng và làm việc và sống dưới những điều kiện tương tự như của những người nông nô thời Trung Cổ. 30% còn lại sống ở các thị trấn với những tâp quán của nền kinh tế xã hội đã phát triển giúp mang họ đến gần một số lĩnh vực trong tiêu chuẩn của người da trắng. Nhưng hầu hết những người Phi Châu trong nhóm này, bị bần cùng hóa vì thu nhập của họ thấp trong khi chi phí cho cuộc sống cao.
Nghèo đói luôn đi kèm với suy dinh dưỡng và bệnh tật. Sự cố suy dinh dưỡng và bệnh tật do thiếu thốn rất cao ở người Phi Châu…
Tuy nhiên, điều người Phi Châu muốn được nói đến không phải chỉ là họ nghèo và người da trắng giàu, mà còn là luật pháp do người da trắng tạo ra được thiết kế để duy trì tình trạng này. Có hai cách để phá vỡ tình trạng nghèo đói. Một là thông qua giáo dục chính thức, và cách thứ hai là bằng cách nâng cao kỹ năng cho người làm việc và nhờ vậy mức lương của họ được tăng lên. Đối với người Phi Châu, cả hai con đường cải thiện đời sống này đều bị cố ý tước đi mất bằng những quy định luật pháp.
Một trở ngại chủ yếu khác khiến người Phi Châu không cải thiện kinh tế được là cản trở màu da trong hoạt động công nghiệp, theo đó tất cả các việc làm tốt trong các ngành công nghiệp đều chỉ được dành riêng cho người Da Trắng. Hơn thế nữa, những người Phi Châu tìm được việc làm với những nghề nghiệp từ không chuyên môn cho đến bán chuyên môn không được phép tổ chức công đoàn được công nhận theo Luật Hòa Giải Công nghiệp. Điều này có nghĩa là mọi cuộc biểu tình của công nhân người Phi Châu là bất hợp pháp, và họ bị phủ nhận quyền thương thảo lương, quyền mà công nhân Da Trắng được trả lương cao hơn được cho phép…
Sự thiếu tôn trọng phẩm cách con người mà người Phi Châu phải trải qua là hệ quả trực tiếp của chính sách da trắng thượng đẳng. Da trắng thượng đẳng nghĩa là ám chỉ người da đen là hạ cấp. Luật pháp được thiết kế để duy trì quyền thượng đẳng của người da trắng giúp củng cố ý niệm này…
Luật lưu hành, đối với người Phi Châu là một trong những những quy định luật bị ghét nhất ở Nam Phi, cho phép cảnh sát được quyền theo dõi người Phi Châu bất cứ lúc nào. Tôi không tin là có được một người đàn ông Phi Châu nào ở Nam Phi trong đời chưa bao giờ đụng chạm với cảnh sát trong lúc đi lại. Hàng trăm và hàng ngàn người Phi Châu bị ném vào nhà giam mỗi năm vì các quy định luật lưu hành. Còn tệ hơn nữa, đây là sự thật, luật lưu hành đó phân cách chồng và vợ và khiến phá vỡ cuộc sống gia đình.
Nghèo đói và gia đình tan vỡ gây ra những ảnh hưởng liên đới khác. Trẻ em lang thang trên đường phố các thị trấn bởi vì các em không có trường để đi học, hoặc không có tiền để có thể đến trường, hoặc không có Cha Mẹ ở nhà để đảm bảo các em đi học, bởi vì cả Cha lẫn Mẹ (nếu như có cả Cha Mẹ) phải đi làm để nuôi sống cả gia đình. Điều này dẫn đến phá vỡ các chuẩn mực đạo đức, tăng một cách đáng báo động trường hợp có con hoang, và tình trạng gia tăng bao lực bùng nổ không chỉ trong chính trị, mà ở tất cả mọi nơi. Cuộc sống ở các thị trấn rất nguy hiểm…
Người Phi Châu muốn được trả lương đủ sống. Người Phi Châu muốn làm việc mà họ đủ sức để làm, chứ không phải làm việc mà Nhà Nước cho rằng họ đủ khả năng để làm. Người Phi Châu muốn được phép sống ở bất cứ đâu họ có thể tìm được việc làm, mà không phải được cho phép mới ra khỏi một khu vực vì họ không sinh ra ở đó. Người Phi Châu muốn được cho phép sở hữu đất đai mà họ làm việc trên đó, mà không phải được gia ơn sống trong nhà thuê mà không bao giờ họ được gọi là nhà mình. Người Phi Châu muốn là một phần của dân số nói chung, mà không phải bị giới hạn sống trong những khu ổ chuột của họ. Người đàn ông Phi Châu muốn vợ và các con sống cùng với họ ở nơi họ làm việc, mà không phải bị ép vào sống một cách thiếu tự nhiên trong các nhà ở dành riêng cho nam. Người phụ nữ Phi Châu muốn được ở cùng với người đàn ông thân thuộc mà không bị bỏ rơi thường trực như quả phụ ở các Khu Bảo Tồn. Người Phi Châu muốn được cho phép ra ngoài sau 11h đêm và không bị nhốt trong phòng của họ như những đứa trẻ con. Người Phi Châu muốn được phép đi lại trong đất nước của họ và tìm việc làm ở nơi họ muốn chứ không phải ở nơi Phòng Lao động bảo họ đến. Người Phi Châu muốn một phần công chính trong toàn bộ Nam Phi; họ muốn an ninh và một phần sở hữu trong xã hội.
Trên tất cả, chúng tôi muốn các quyền bình đẳng về chính trị, bởi vì không có nó, những thiệt thòi của chúng tôi sẽ trở thành vĩnh viễn. Tôi biết điều này nghe rất cách mạng đối với những người da trắng trong đất nước này bởi vì khi đó đa số người đi bỏ phiếu bầu cử sẽ là người Phi Châu. Nó sẽ khiến người da trắng sợ hãi nền dân chủ.
Nhưng sợ hãi này không thể được cho phép nằm ngáng đường cản trở giải pháp duy nhất giúp đảm bảo sự hòa hợp chủng tộc và tự do cho tất cả mọi người. Sự ban quyền bầu cử cho tất cả mọi người sẽ đem lại sự thống trị của một vài chủng tộc là không đúng. Sự phân chia về chính trị, dựa trên màu da, là hoàn toàn không tự nhiên và khi nó biến mất, sự thống trị của một nhóm màu da trên một nhóm khác cũng sẽ biến mất…
Trong suốt cuộc đời tôi, tôi hiến dâng chính mình cho cuộc đấu tranh này của nhân dân Phi Châu. Tôi đã chiến đấu chống lại sự thống trị của người da trắng, và tôi đã chiến đấu chống lại sự thống trị của người da đen. Tôi đã ấp ủ trong lòng lý tưởng của một xã hội tự do và dân chủ ở đó tất cả mọi người sống hòa hợp với nhau và có những cơ hội bình đẳng như nhau. Đây là lý tưởng mà tôi hy vọng sống cho nó và đạt được nó. Nhưng nếu cần, đây là lý tưởng mà vì nó tôi sẵn sàng để chết.
Nelson Mandela – Ngày 20 Tháng 04 Năm 1964.
(Hồng Quyên dịch)
(Translated excerpts in red)
I am the First Accused.
I hold a Bachelor’s Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.
At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said.
In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case.
Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.
I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.
In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.
I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organization, and which have been charged in the indictment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organization.
I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.
But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, and not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.
The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years – that is until 1949 – it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater.
In the words of my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952, and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:
“Who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all.”
Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and non-violence had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word ‘Amadelakufa’ was first used: this was the time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. They were, and are, dedicated workers who are prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.
During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the ANC adhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the Suppression of Communism Act.
The non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgement some five years later, it found that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a communist organization.
In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the Government,’ and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self-respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say.
In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic.
As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest.
The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The Government’s answer was to introduce new and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkhonto.
Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963.
I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how?
We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were.
But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence – of the day when they would fight the White man and win back their country – and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial State by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.
It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out – it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it.
Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government – though this is what prompted it – but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness.
At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force. This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said:
“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices – submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom.”
This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.
We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations, including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe.
As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized as follows:
- It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence.
- Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization.
- On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be subject to disciplinary action by the ANC.
I say ‘properly controlled violence’ because I made it clear that if I formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.
As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?
The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one which recognized civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable.
Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.
In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD):
“We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war.”
The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.
Attacks on the economic life-lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.
In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass
reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government.
This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of ‘Mr. X’ and ‘Mr. Z.’
The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an importation from the Jewish national underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948.
Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations.
The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by suggesting the laager.
In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained.
But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines were being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so, how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?
Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release were killed by the police and white civilians. In 1921 more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1 May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike. On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.
How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could black and white ever live together again in peace and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions.
Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favorable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare.
All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.
At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means.
Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a State.
It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and even in London I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.
I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject – from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views.
I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original decision of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South Africa.
I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document which is Exhibit R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened, the training would be of value.
I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto.
One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why this is incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the original principle laid down by the ANC. There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internally as well, because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by bannings and house arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up political work abroad. This led to individuals having to do work in different capacities. But though this may have blurred the distinction between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction. Great care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations in South Africa distinct. The ANC remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto remained a small organization recruiting its members from different races and organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that members of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons served both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view, change the nature of the ANC or give it a policy of violence. This overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than the rule. This is why persons such as ‘Mr. X’ and ‘Mr. Z,’ who were on the Regional Command of their respective areas, did not participate in any of the ANC committees or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their ANC meetings.
Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and knew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place.
I came there in the following manner:
• As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country, living now in African townships, then in country villages and again in cities.
• During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.
• In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could live differently and work far more efficiently.
For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on 5 August.
Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there, and no activities connected with them were either organized or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm.
Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine.
- Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done.
- Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party.
The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, ‘Drive the White man into the sea.’ The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the ‘Freedom Charter.’ It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization, of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC’s policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.
As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its program.
The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party’s main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction.
It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal – in this case the removal of white supremacy – and is not proof of a complete community of interests.
The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist world.
Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.
I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of communism, fought together with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930s.
This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists could, and did, become members of the ANC, and some served on the National, Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee.
I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since.
It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act.
It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our enemies.
I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are.
I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.
Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.
It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists.
Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.
From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system.
The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world.
I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country’s system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fails to arouse my admiration.
The American Congress, that country’s doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments.
I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East . . .
There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question.
Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources – from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important political case – for example, the Treason Trial – we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources.
But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states.
I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received similar assistance.
On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed.
I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so.
As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of ‘Mr. X,’ the suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enroll the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of the community would join us.
Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, ‘so-called hardships.’ Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called ‘agitators’ to teach us about these things.
South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per cent are laborers, labor tenants, and squatters on white farms and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30 per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living.
The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr’s department) is R42.84 per month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going.
Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African laborers.
The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.
The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on this supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act.
There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African children in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capita Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in the Cape Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent.
The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Educational Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953:
“When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge.”
The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial color-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by the so-called ‘civilized labor policy’ under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages which far exceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry.
The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.
The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions – that they fall in love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what ‘house-boy’ or ‘garden-boy’ or laborer can ever hope to do this?
Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.
Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.
Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men’s hostels. African women want to be with their menfolk and not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o’clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labor Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.
Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy.
But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on color, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one color group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.
This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
Nelson Mandela – April 20, 1964
Post-note: On June 11, 1964, at the conclusion of the trial, Mandela was found guilty on four charges of sabotage and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He began his sentence in the notorious Robben Island Prison, a maximum security prison on a small island off the coast near Cape Town. A worldwide campaign to free Mandela began in the 1980s and resulted in his release on February 11, 1990, at age 71, after 27 years in prison. In 1993, Mandela shared the Nobel Peace Prize with South Africa’s President F.W. de Klerk for their peaceful efforts to bring a non-racial democracy to South Africa. Black South Africans voted for the first time in the 1994 election that brought Mandela the presidency of South Africa.
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